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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that U.S. productivity decline occurred 
because of some profound changes in the American economy. It 
is also argued that the same changes help to explain the economy's 
increasing inflationary bias. 
INTRODUCTION 
A DYNAMIC VIEW OF THE ECONOMY 
Burton H. Klein 
California Institute of Technology 
No one can deny that the U.S. economy is becoming more 
predictable than it once was--more predictable in the sense that it 
no longer generates the technological supriees of the first half 
of this century. But in the process it has become a more unstable 
economy: in order to deal with double-digit inflation more serious 
downturns are requirea to dampen the rate of inflation. 
How can an economy become simultaneously more predictable 
and less stable? It is commonly believed that a stable economic 
system must be as predictable as the planets. That stability and 
predictability go hand in hand, we are told, is no· more tha.n conunon 
sense. But is it? In the changes made in its product line 
Chrysler was certainly a far more predictable company after World 
War II than it was during the 20s and 30s. Yet, at the same time 
that Chrysler became a more predictable it became a more unstable 
system. Though in the 30s Chrysler was taking business away from 
Ford and General Motors, it now is asking the government for a loan 
needed to compensate for its inflexibility. 
Or consider an even larger economic system: by displaying 
the lowest rate of productivity growth for more than one hundred years 
the British economy has been the most predictable of all the 
industrialized countries. But from the point of view of being 
able to weather the current economic storm, it is in much the 
same position as Chrylser. 
It is true that in an imaginary unchanging world, 
economies can be predictable in both the small and the large: 
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that is, they can survive by simply taking the classical law of 
supply and demand as a given. In other words, microstability 
(predictability in the small) can be equated with macrostability 
(predictability in the large) only in a world wherein no surprises 
occur. But in the uncertain real world, the greater the insistence 
upon microstability, the more that macrostability will be jeopardized. 
Thus, while the American steel industry ranks very high from the 
point of view of microstability--consider how predictable are its 
technological processes--from the point of view of its overall 
ability to deal with new circumstances it ranks very low--so low 
that its predictability in the large is highly dependent upon the 
adoption by the government of protective measures. An industry 
that possesses only a modestly greater degree of macrostability 
is the American automobile industry. Ever since the mid 1920s, 
competition in the automobile industry featured fewer and fewer 
substantive changes in its product lines and more and more cosmetic 
changes. Indeed, as of the early 1960s, competition in this industry 
relied almost entirely upon "style"--whether in the form of long 
tail fins or more powerful engines. During the late 60s the industry 
had to face new challenges in the form of rapidly increasing imports 
of small foreign cars and rising gasoline prices. However, the 
slowness of the industry to deal with these challenges only confirms 
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the fact that once an industry has acquired a high degree of 
microstability recovery is by no means easy. Though during the 
earlier postwar years Chrysler survived while being managed by 
accountants who completely downplayed the technological virtuosity 
that enabled Chrysler to rise to second place in the industry during 
the 1930s, reorganizing such a corporation to meet new challenges 
is something like getting the Army to understand that preoccupation 
with making tanks ever larger and more powerful by no means con­
stitutes a way to make the outcome of future battles highly 
predictable. 
At the other end of the spectrum are not only relatively 
new firms such as Hewlett-Packard, but very old firms such as 
Corning Glass. Both firms are difficult to associate with any 
particular end product; due to their almost constant efforts to 
renew themse.lves their industrial borders have changed very sub­
stantially. Thus, ever since it made the glass for Edison's first 
light bulbs, Corning has been able to generate about one significant 
innovation every decade. In recent years these innovations included 
Pyrex glass, ceramic materials to remove the emissions from automobile 
exhausts, optical fibers (a substitute for copper cables), and a 
special glass that is used in test kits for diagnosing various 
diseases. To be sure, not all of its R&D efforts have been success­
ful; for example, trying to develop heat exchangers for turbine 
automobiles proved to be a blind alley (although work on the ceramics 
proved to be of critical importance for developing an automobile 
emissions system). 
I 
What, then, determines whether economies will have a 
relatively high or low degree of macrostability? To consider this 
key question, it will be useful to refer to the familiar S-shaped 
curve relating the performance of a technology to time (Chart I). 
How is the performance of a technology to be measured? Ideally, 
we would like to have a single measure that took into account both 
reductions in costs and improvements in quality. However, since 
it is practically impossible to devise such a measure, we must 
choose between a cost or a quality measure, depending upon which 
will provide the most accurate estimates. 
If the performance of a technology is appropi.iately 
measured, the typical picture is as shown--in which a period of 
fast history (with the curve rising rapidly) is followed by one of 
slow history (when the rate of progress flattens). The dashed 
lines represent discoveries such as the Model T Ford or the planar 
transistor--which when viewed as isolated events were quite 
unpredictable. On the basis of my definition of ''dynamic," both 
fast and slow history are to be regarded as dynamic processes: 
both involve adapting to new circumstances by discovering new 
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alternatives. The essential difference is that fast history involves 
dealing with new circumstances more rapidly which requires a higher 
degree of macrostahility. 
Why, then, does fast history sooner or later turn into 
slow history? According to conventional wisdom, after the promising 
ideas for making nonincremental advances have been exhausted, 
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entrepreneurs have no alternative but to bring about incremental 
advances. However, I do not subscribe to this line of reasoning. 
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In the first place, how soon a technology runs into diminishing 
returns depends on how broadly or narrowly it is defined; and 
people, not nature, determine how broadly it is defined. For 
example, if computer technology had been defined to exclude the 
possibility of semiconductors, today we would be witnessing slow 
history in computer technology. In the second place, if ideas 
represented the main shortage, then, when revitalizing discoveries 
were made--discoveries such as the Bessemer process in steel or the 
jet engine--we would expect major fimrs in the industry to account 
for their share of such discoveries. But of fifty cases I have 
looked into, in not one did a major firm in the industry bring about 
a revitalizing discovery. They were made by firms in another 
industry, new firms in the industry in question, or occasionally 
by university laboratories, but never by major firms in an industry 
featuring slow history. Another reason that makes the thesis of 
diminishing opportunities questionable is that when challenged by 
newer technologies ways are often discovered to bring about a more 
rapid rate of incremental improvements in older technologies. Thus, 
firms in the ice-making business found ways to bring about a whole 
series of significant improvements when challenged by the newer 
refrigeration technology. After a serious loss of business to the 
trucking industry, people in the railroad industry found ways to 
double their productivity gains. And challenged by synthetic 
fibers, cotton textiles were improved both in quality and cost. 
The principal reason technologies eventually are defined 
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very narrowly and their progress slows down is not due to a shortage 
of ideas, but, rather, to a shortage of hidden-foot feedback. 
Hidden-foot feedback is the feedback a firm receives from its 
rivals; and it is measured in terms of changes in market shares. 
Consider, first, a situation in which hidden-foot feedback is 
maximized: as describes the semiconductor industry of, say, 10 
years ago. In this situation firms will be trying to generate 
highly discontinuous advances; and, if they are doing so, it can 
be predicted that, statistically speaking, one will almost invariably be 
favored by luck and cleverness to a greater extent than others. 
When this occurs the less lucky firms will suffer as much as 30· 
to 40 percent declines in market shares for an important class 
of products (and some may go out of business). In such a situation 
no one in the industry can predict which particular firm will be 
most favored by luck. However, it can be predicted that ln, 
say, a three year period one or another firm will turn up with a 
highly successful advance. In such a situation it will obviously 
pa.y firms to more or less continuously anticipate negative feedback 
by being prepared to do to others what they might do to them. 
And, generally speaking., such situations are to be associated with 
a high degree of macrostability. 
Now at the other extreme, consider industries whose 
firms have so little ability to cope with uncertainty that they 
dare not do unto other firms what they would not like obher firms 
to do to them, e.g., the automobile or steel industries. In such 
industries a delicate balance of power can be maintained only if 
the managements impose sharp constraints on their engineers. And 
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it can be predicted that there will be trivial differences with 
respect to both products and prices. To be sure, even with the hidden 
foot completely absent, the hidden hand will still result in some 
productivity gains. But they will be much smaller than when both 
the hidden hand and hidden foot are in full operation. 
In between these extremes there are situations in which, 
though the size of the advance attempted is not great, there are 
still quite significant changes in market shares. The strategy 
will be more or less the same as in the first situation described 
a bove, but the premium for imaginativeness will not be as great. 
Or more commonly, threats may come from newly established firms 
or from firms in other industries--but they may not be as predictable. 
For example, during the postwar era AT&T had to deal with a larger 
variety of threats to its monopolistic position than it had previous 
to World War I I, which in turn motiviated it to become a far more 
dynamic organization. A very quick technological response was the 
strategy it chose for dealing with such threats. Or, if a technological 
response did not avail, AT&T effectively responded with intervention 
in the regulatory process (for example, by preventing underseas 
telephone cables from becoming obsolete)� Thus, the principal 
difference between AT&T and General Motors is not of a strategic 
nature but, rather, a difference in the effectiveness of its 
response. However, if AT&T possessed only Western Electric and not 
Bell Telephone Laboratories, that difference would not be nearly 
as significant. 
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If such firms are to put the odds on their side when 
dealing with imaginative rivals, they must ask themselves searching 
questions about their technological opportunities, and tough questions 
about the need to revamp their organizations to exploit these 
opportunities (i.e., the entrepreneurial function). Moreover, this 
question-raising function has a major influence on their internal 
characteristics. In such organizations there is likely to be a good 
deal of feedback in the form of pecuniary and nonpecuniary rewards 
for individual creative accomplishments. Generally speaking, 
salaries in such organizations are based on creative accomplishments 
and are not highly correlated with either age or administrative 
position. I n  turn, such a reward structure encourages organizations 
to be highly interactive internally, with their cristomers, 
and with universities--so interactive that the authorship of particular 
discoveries is always in dispute. Consequently, necessity in the 
form of the hidden foot results in highly interactive questioning 
organizations, and by doing so, increases the probability that 
such organizations will be favored by chance. 
In short, my explanation of fast history is a statistical 
one. Necessity, in the form of the hidden foot, stimulates 
entrepreneurs to ask burning questions, and motivates highly 
interactive organizations to answer these questions. This activity, 
in turn, results in a lot of luck, both good and bad. But inasmuch 
as only the good luck gets recorded, fast history is made to appear 
so smooth, it seems to have been preordained. Thus, to explain 
rapid economic progress we need a model which is neither completely 
deterministic (because it fails to recognize the entrepreneurial 
question-raising activity and the associated role of luck) nor 
completely stochastic (because by failing to recognize that man's 
destiny is not entirely determined by God's throwing dice is 
simply another brand of determinism)--but, rather, one that 
acknowledges a reciprocal relationship between necessity and luck 
(i.e., a formal dynamic model is now being developed at Caltech). 
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The principal factor in determining whether or not an 
industry will generate relatively much or little feedback is the 
ability of new firms to enter the industry. If they hope to become 
a major factor in the industry new firms obviously have an incentive 
to ask themselves tough and searching questions. And by doing so, 
these newly established firms not only contribute toward producing 
more than their share of discoveries, they also stimulate existing 
firms to become quicker borrowers of n�w ideas. 
However, during the evolution of a technology both 
scale economies and various types of vertical integration become 
more important--with the consequence that the cost of entering the 
industry increases by one or two orders of magnitude. This is 
the essential reason the rate of entry almost always slows down-­
and the essential reason why fast history is sooner or later 
superceded by slow history, when due to the relative absence of 
hidden-foot feedback chance plays a smaller role. 
II 
Why does a trend toward microstability--as measured 
in terms of a larger and larger proportion of slow history 
industries--jeopardize a country's long-term macrostability, 
as measured by its rate of productivity gain? If it costs only 
one twentieth as much to bring about an incremental advance as 
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it does a discontinuous advance, and if twenty small steps bought as 
much progress as one large one, then slow history would not be 
expensive history and the rate of productivity gain need not 
decline. However, generally speaking, incremental advances are likely 
to be inexpensive only when preceded by a period of fast history; and 
when not so preceded to cost a good deal more (e.g., as Edsel cost 
more to develop than the model Tj as recently developed jet engines 
cost much more than earlier ones). True the failure rate associated 
with discontinuous advances is much greater. But even so, progress via 
fast history is a good deal cheaper than progress via slow history. 
Not only is there much less good luck (as well as much less 
bad luck), but microstability becomes a way of life. Instead of 
accepting personal responsibility people impose on themselves 
all sorts of rules and regulations, so, if anything does go wrong 
no one can be blamed; and the degree of internal bureaucracy 
is further enhanced by the formation of tight internal alliances 
dedicated to the preservation of the statue quo. From the .point 
of view of an insider who can have, at best, only a marginal impact 
on his organization, acting to conserve hie power while putting on 
a great show of looking busy is eminently rational behavior. 
It is this kind of bureaucratic environment that makes incremental 
progress so slow and expensive. 
Many economists assume that because private firms obey 
the discipline of the marketplace and public organizations do not, 
the difference between them is as great as the difference between day 
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and night. This, however, is simply not true. If bureaucratic 
behavior is defined as highly predictable behavior that makes 
organizations highly insensitive to feedback, then we can expect to 
observe an entire spectrum of private firms from highly adaptive 
to highly bureaucratic. In industries with little or no rivalry 
there is no real difference between public and private organizations. 
For example, in the degree of bureaucratic behavior they display, 
banks, public utility companies, and steel companies are not 
very different from the Defense Department, the Post Office 
Department, or the Environmental Protection Agency. 
Although the EPA ia not ubGolutcly unique in itG degree 
of bureaucratic (i.e., predictable) behavior, because of its impact 
on the dynamic stability of the country it does deserve special 
mention. The EPA has contributed not only to a slowdown in productivity 
gains, as customarily measured, but also to making progress in 
lowering the rate of environmental degradation much slower than 
it otherwise might be. The blame goes back to the Congress 
which seemed to feel that cleaning up the environment was 
like a supposedly one-time task of cleaning a dirty room. The 
authors of the Clean Air Act assumed that by hiring droves of 
lawyers to oversee this task they could, in effect, repeal the 
second law of thermodynamics. Unfortunately, however, new things 
are being learned almost daily about how to increase the rate of 
productivity as it applies to lessening the rate of environmental 
degradation. But, because the EPA bureaucracy is almost totally 
incapable of dealing with new circumstances, progress is both 
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terribly slow and terribly expensive. Nevertheless, it is my 
conviction that the fundamental factor for the productivity decline 
has been the increasing shortage of hidden-foot feedback. 
To summarize: There is a longer-term tradeoff between 
the degree of hidden-foot feedback and the cost of making progress. 
This is the discontinuous tradeof f shown in Chart II. When the 
entry of new firms creates a good deal of hidden-foot feedback, the 
cost of progress will be relatively small. On the other hand, when 
because of a shortage of such feedback organizations impose a 
high degree of bureaucracy upon themselves, the cost of progress 
is likely to be very large. It should be apparent, therefore, 
that a decline in feedback and an increase in private and public 
bureaucratic behavior threatens the longer-term stability of the 
economy by making the role of productivity gain smaller than it other­
¥ise would be. And the essential reason that the long-term rate of 
productivity gain in the U.S. is falling is that we are being 
driven up to the top of this discontinuous curve. 
III 
A serious decline in feedback jeopardizes not only the 
long-term but also the short-term economic stability of an economy. 
tn particular, the decline begets an economy in which larger and 
larger recessions are required to restrain the rate of inflation. 
Putting aside the inflation issue for a moment, I want to point 
out, first, that an economy in which a significant number of indus­
tries are generating a large amount of feedback minimizes the amplitude 
of business cycles, because those industries that generate a good 
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deal of feedback are likely to suffer less from economic downturns. 
To test this and another hypothesis, over the summer I 
was engaged in research concerning the statistical performance of 
some 500 manuracturing industries. The study, covering the period 
1958 to 1976, was based upon unpublished data for these industries 
supplied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data base included 
information on output, productivity, prices, unit labor costs and 
wage rates. 
To analyze the data we divided industries into three 
groups based upon their performance in bringing about productivity 
gains during the first half of that period. The high performance 
group was defined as those industries whose mean rate of 
productivity gain during the first half of the period was more 
than one standard deviation above the average, and included 
industries·such as semiconductors, computers, synthetic fibers, 
pharmaceutical preparations, fertilizers, radio and TV sets, 
household refrigerators, and malt beverages: industries seemingly 
characterized by a relatively high degree of rivalry (although 
direct measures of changes in market shares are unavailable). 
The low perf onnance group was comprised of industries whose 
productivity gains were one deviation below the average, and it 
included industries such as frozen fruits, men's and boy's suits, 
newspapers, books, metal cans, and primary lead: industries 
characterized by very little rivalry. 
AB Chart I I I  shows, until the 1973-1974 downturn, recessions 
in the high performance group of industries were almost entirely 
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in their rate of growth. There are two reasons why, by being 
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less subject to downturns, such industries contributed to the overall 
stability of the economy. First, firms that have to deal with a 
large amount of feedback more or less continuously and experience 
sharp downturns even when the economy is highly prosperous are 
better able to deal with recessions. Second, by virtue of having 
an advantage over less dynamic £inns in being able to recognize 
a potential unsatisfied demand for new products, such firms tend 
to be involved in activities that are less subject to downturns. 
For both of these reasons the regions of the country less affected 
by serious downturns are those that have industries chatacterized 
by a relatively high degree of macrostability, for example, 
California or the southern states since World War II. 
However, as Chart III shows, during the 1973-1974 
downturn the high performance industries experienced a very 
significant decline in output, in fact, a decline quite as serious 
as in the medium and low productivity industries. And their 
productivity performance began to display a more cyclical pattern. 
Indeed, by being highly associated with the business cycle their 
productivity performance began to resemble that of the medium and 
low performance groups. 
AB Chart IV shows, in manufacturing industries as a 
whole the rate of productivity increase tends to slow down during 
economic recoveries in anticipation of a general decline in out-
put; and in increases during recessions in anticipation of an up-
turn in the level of output. Thus, the 1958, 1970, and the 
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1973 downturns were preceded by periods in which the trend of 
productivity gain was generally downward. Moreover it should 
be noted that this pattern of behavior is not peculiar to the post-
World War II period. Since 1890, movements in productivity in 
manufacturing as a whole have been �ighly associated with the 
business cycle--and in three out of four cycles movements in 
productivity have provided good lead indicators of both downturns 
and upturns. 
How is this to be explained? It is true that capacity 
constraints become more and more important during an upturn, and 
that to further expand the labor force it is necessary to draw upon 
marginal workers. It is also true that once the downturn starts 
there is a tendency not to reduce employment as rapidly as output 
declines. However, such an argument cannot explain why the rate 
of productivity increase (as distinct from the absolute level of 
productivity) rises above zero dur:ing upturns, providing the 
economy with a higher absolute level of productivity than it 
ever had before. As Chart IV shows, only in the 1973-1974 downturn 
did the rate of productivity gain go below zero. In general the 
most impressive advances in the rate occur while coming out of 
recessions. 
My explanation of such behavior is simply this: In 
industries in which the hidden foot plays a relatively modest 
role, negative feedback in the form of lower profits occurs 
mainly during recessions. Therefore, it can be predicted that 
their search for ways to improve productivity will be widest when 
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negative feedback is maximized and narrowest when minimized. 
Thus, even putting the question of inflation aside, 
it should be apparent that a decline in feedback will jeopardize 
the short-run stability of the economy. The less firms depend 
upon each other for their negative feedback, and the more they 
depend on economic downturns, the greater will be the downturns. 
IV. 
Finally, I will describe how an economic system obsessed 
by the desire for microstability tends to generate a maximum rate 
of inflation while the country is heading into a recession--which 
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greatly complicates the task of controlling inflati·on. This tendency 
was exhibited most strikingly during the downswing which began in 
1973 and ended in 1975, at which time the rate of inflation in 
manufacturing increased from about 3 percent to over 11 percent 
annually (ChartV). True, something like one-third of the overall 
rise in prices can be attributed to the increased cost of oil 
inputs. But, after taking OPEC actions into account, we are still 
left with the conclusion that in manufacturing the rate of 
inflation more than doubled during the downturn, and abated only 
after recovery w�s well underway. Moreover, it should be noted 
that this sort of price behavior is not new. During the recession 
which began during the late 1960s the rate of inflation in manufacturing 
doubled. In fact, during each major downturn since World War II 
prices have behaved less flexibly than in the preceding one. 
How is this price behavior to be explained? I n  the first 
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place, as was already pointed out, there is a tendency for the 
rate of productivity advance to begin declining before output has 
reached its peak, and to continue to decline during the downturn. 
Closely associated with this tendency is the fact that 
unit labor costs increase during downturns (curve labelled+). 
Unit labor costs are defined as the average costs of producing a 
particular volume of output; and in manufacturing they account 
for roughly 75 percent of all costs. Now, unit labor costs reflect 
changes in wage rates as well as in productivity. If productivity 
rises more rapidly than wage rates unit labor costs will decline; 
if hourly wage rates rise more rapidly than productivity they will 
increase. Nevertheless, the cyclical swings in productivity have 
been so large that their influence upon unit wage costs has been 
the dominant influence. This is indicated by Chart VI, which shows 
the relationship between changes in productivity and changes in unit 
wage costs. For those not familiar with this type of diagram, 
note that it is constructed simply by counting the number of 
observations in each cell and by making the heights of the 
contours proportional to them. Its main advantage over the familiar 
scatter diagram is that it better pennits us to see the changes 
which have occurred in a distribution between two time periods. 
2 In this particular case, the global correlation coefficient, R , 
remained about the same in both periods; and the principal change 
was an extension of observations along the correlation line�-
that is, relatively high negative productivity rates became 
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associated with very large increases in unit wage costs; and very 
large productivity rates became associated with small increases 
in unit costs. 
In short, the picture is almost the direct antitheses 
of the conventional wisdom in economics. According to most 
macro models, steady advances in productivity occur routinely--
and increase in wages during periods of high employment lead to 
higher prices. However, as was explained previously, during 
the last two downturns, the maximum rate of inflation occurred 
not when unemployment was low but, rather, when relatively high. 
And because cost-of-living allowances have played an increasingly 
important role in wage contracts, wage rates too have become relatively 
insensitive to the rate of unemployment. Thus, during the past 
two recessions there was no significant reduction in the rate of 
increase. · 
At the same time as movements in prices have become less 
and less sensitive to general business conditions, they have 
become increasingly sensitive to costs. As Chart VII shows, 
from the period 1958-1967 to the period 1956-1976, the coefficient 
2 
of correlation (R ) between unit wage costs and prices moved 
up from .3 to .5, with very large increases in unit costs tending 
to be associated with large increases in prices. Moreover, after 
adjusting for increases in the cost of oil inputs, the coefficient 
of correlation during the latter period is almost .65. 
We all know that if business f inns are to survive in 
the longer-run prices must cover costs. But apparently business 
firms would like, if they could, to set prices in a manner to 
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balance their budgets at each point during the business cycle. 
Just as R & D projects are managed in a way to insure a high 
degree of predictability in the short-run, so are prices, And 
both reveal an economy posessed with a quest for microstability. 
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The increasing insensitivity of wages and prices to 
economic downturns is, of course, but another indication of the 
development of highly bureaucratic business finns and labor unions. 
In industries featuring a good deal of rivalry there are typically 
large differences in profit rates; and for fear of putting less 
profitable firms out of business union leaders in such industries 
have been very statesmanlike in their wage demands. Consequently, 
during the period 1958 to 1967, wages in the high productivity 
industries increased by no more than wages in the medium and 
low productivity industries. And when wage and price escalation 
started in the late 1960s, it was industries like steel that led 
the way. It can be agreed, of course, that were it not for the 
large increase in public expenditures during the late 1960s 
inflation might not have started. But it also must be agreed that 
an economy in which highly bureaucratic business firms and 
labor unions thrive because of a shortage of hidden-foot feedback is 
an economy highly vulnerable to inflationary shocks. 
Moreove·r, once inflation has begun, such wage price 
behavior leads to deeper recessions, because more stern action must 
be taken in order to throttle the rate of inflation. Indeed, if it 
is needed to prevent a really serious economic disaster, a recession 
with an 8 to 10 percent unemployment rate no longer seems as serious 
as it once did. 
v. 
In summary, if my argument is correct, the inability 
of a dynamically unstable economy to deal with new circumstances 
can be revealed in several ways, including in the short-run a 
relatively low ability to deal with inflationary shocks and 
recessions, and in the longer-run sharp increases in the cost of 
progress and a consequent reduction in the long-term rate of 
productivity gain. 
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Given the self-correcting role that feedback plays in 
other systems, it would be surprising, indeed, if it played an almost 
zero role in the functioning of an economic system. To be sure, 
in an economic system negative feedback does not result in the 
almost automatic self-correcting mechanism .it does in a cybernetic 
system such as steering a ship. Rather, its role is more like 
that played by feedback in biology--for example, when confronted 
by necessity chimpanzees can be observed to invent completely 
new tools for themselves. But the fact that feedback does not play 
an automatic role in economic and biological systems does not make 
its role any less important. 
I t  is my conviction that until this role is better 
understood and more widely appreciated, there is little hope for 
policy reform in this country. I ndeed, unless the stabilizing role 
becomes regarded as a very natural role, and unless politicians 
become something other than experts at removing feedback from an 
economic system, capitalism will not survive. 
